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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND 
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF DISPARATE 
IMPACT DOCTRINE UNDER TITLE VIII 
INTRODUCTION  
The disparate impact theory, which allows a plaintiff to make out a 
case of discrimination without proving the defendant’s intent to 
discriminate,1 has been one of the most controversial and highly 
debated areas of antidiscrimination law.2 Despite the criticism it has 
received, disparate impact doctrine is almost universally accepted as 
an important part of antidiscrimination law.3 Still, disparate impact 
doctrine is fraught with inconsistencies and variations that have 
proven a source of confusion among courts and scholars, particularly 
in the contexts of employment and housing discrimination. 
While Supreme Court precedent and the Civil Rights Act of 19914 
have given courts ample guidance in addressing disparate impact 
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”),5 
the law is less settled with respect to cases brought under the Fair 
Housing Act,6 also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (“Title VIII”).7 The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether 
Title VIII includes a disparate impact standard, however, all of the 
circuit courts to address the issue have answered this question in the 
                                                                                                                 
1 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
2 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
702 (2006). 
3 Deborah Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1693 (1997). 
4 Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2000)). See Part I.A for further discussion of the 1991 Act. 
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
6 Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair 
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 416 
(1998) (discussing the inconsistencies in Title VIII jurisprudence). 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
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affirmative.8 Still, these lower courts have failed to reach a consensus 
over the proper test to apply when evaluating disparate impact claims 
brought under Title VIII. While a number of courts have adopted the 
“burden-shifting” test commonly applied in Title VII cases,9 other 
courts continue to apply a quasi-constitutional “balancing test” 
developed in early Title VIII decisions.10 
In addition to this divide over the proper standard, questions have 
recently arisen over the relationship between disparate impact 
doctrine and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. 
DeStefano11 raises the possibility that disparate impact doctrine may 
directly conflict with equal protection.12 As Ricci suggests, disparate 
impact may encourage third parties to engage in race-conscious 
decision making. And disparate impact provisions may, themselves, 
qualify as “racial classifications,” such that equal protection 
jurisprudence would compel a strict scrutiny analysis.13 
Therefore, assuming that a constitutional challenge is inevitable,14 
courts must construe the disparate impact doctrine in a manner that 
comports with equal protection and strict scrutiny analysis. While 
courts have utilized disparate impact as both a method of remedying 
the social hierarchies that have resulted from past discrimination and 
                                                                                                                 
8 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 
1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 
482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. 
Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 
789, 791–92 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147–48 (3d Cir. 
1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974)). See generally John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing 
Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 141, 174 (2002) (“[V]irtually every jurisdiction has held that the ‘disparate impact’ 
discrimination analysis is appropriate in FHA cases.”).  
9 See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Rizzo, 564 F.2d 
126; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179; Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. 
v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008). 
10 See, e.g., Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243, 1252; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of 
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), judgment aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arlington 
Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283. 
11 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
12 See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) 
[hereinafter, Primus, Future] (demonstrating that while Ricci was an employment case brought 
under Title VII, its implications for disparate impact extend beyond the employment context). 
13 See infra Part II.B for a complete discussion of these issues. 
14 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he war between disparate 
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking 
about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”). 
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an “evidentiary dragnet” designed to “smoke out” instances of 
intentional discrimination,15 the doctrine is most likely to survive a 
constitutional challenge under the latter construction.16 Specifically, 
when viewed as a tool for uncovering instances of intentional 
discrimination that are often difficult or impossible to prove, disparate 
impact may survive strict scrutiny review; the government’s interest 
in deterring racial discrimination may be sufficiently compelling to 
justify the race-based classifications that disparate impact either 
embodies or promotes. 17 
Because strict scrutiny also requires that racial classifications be 
“narrowly tailored” to serve a compelling government interest, 
however, disparate impact must also operate in a manner that directly 
serves the government’s interest in remedying hidden intentional 
discrimination, without imposing an undue burden on innocent 
parties.18 While the concept of “narrow tailoring” remains largely 
undefined, this requirement may provide valuable guidance to courts 
searching for the proper test to apply in Title VIII cases. 
As this Note will illustrate, the “balancing test” formulation of 
disparate impact may prevent the doctrine from effectively serving 
the government’s interest in preventing intentional discrimination, 
such that disparate impact provisions may not satisfy the narrow 
tailoring requirement. And because the balancing test often fails to 
consider the full extent of a defendant’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory interests, it may unduly burden defendants who are 
undeserving of liability under the evidentiary dragnet view of 
disparate impact. Moreover, since the balancing test often measures 
the adverse effects of a housing practice based only on the income of 
potential applicants, it may lead courts to dismiss cases where a 
discriminatory motive is present, as housing providers often rely on 
factors other than income when deciding how to allocate housing.19 
In contrast to the balancing test, the burden-shifting analysis may 
more effectively serve the government’s interests in rooting out 
intentional discrimination, as it offers courts the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                 
15 See Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 494, 520–21 (2003) [hereinafter, Primus, Round Three] (describing these constructions 
of disparate impact doctrine). 
16 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1383–84 (arguing that disparate impact is most likely 
to serve a compelling interest when interpreted as an evidentiary dragnet). 
17 Id. at 1378 (“The compelling interest in remedying hidden intentional discrimination 
may justify the existence of disparate impact doctrine . . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506–08 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (discussing the “narrowly tailored” requirement). 
19 See infra Part III(C)(1). 
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expose the true motives behind a defendant’s actions. The burden-
shifting analysis may also reduce the pressure felt by employers and 
housing providers to take race-conscious actions for the sole purpose 
of avoiding disparate impact liability, thus reducing one potential 
source of constitutional conflict.20 Thus, if disparate impact is to 
survive a constitutional challenge within the framework of strict 
scrutiny, courts should adopt the burden-shifting test as the proper 
framework for Title VIII disparate impact claims. 21 
Of course, the different contexts and concerns faced by employers 
and housing providers indicate that burden-shifting analysis, as it is 
applied in Title VII, may not be an entirely perfect fit for Title VIII 
disparate impact claims. Though Title VII provides a proper 
framework, several modifications to the test are warranted when 
applied in the housing context. Specifically, this Note argues that 
because certain justifications carry less weight in the housing context, 
Title VIII defendants seeking to justify their practices under the 
“business necessity” prong of the burden-shifting analysis must 
satisfy a higher standard. 
Part I of this Note will illustrate the development and current 
application of disparate impact doctrine, and will underscore the lack 
of consistency among lower courts over the proper test to apply in 
Title VIII cases. Part I will also highlight the two most commonly 
applied standards, including the Arlington Heights II “balancing test” 
and the Title VII “burden-shifting” test. Part II will identify and 
explore an additional source of confusion in disparate impact 
doctrine—the possible conflict recognized in Ricci between disparate 
impact doctrine and the constitutional principle of equal protection. 
Part III will explore how, despite this conflict, disparate impact may 
survive a constitutional challenge within the framework of strict 
scrutiny, even when construed as an “evidentiary dragnet.” If 
disparate impact is to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict 
scrutiny, however, only the burden-shifting test will achieve this 
result. Finally, Part IV will discuss the differences between housing 
and employment, and will argue in favor of certain variations on the 
burden-shifting test when applied to Title VIII, particularly with 
respect to the “business necessity” prong of the analysis. Specifically, 
Part IV will argue that while a heightened business necessity standard 
akin to constitutional “intermediate scrutiny” may be most 
appropriate in cases involving private defendants, a higher 
                                                                                                                 
20 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing sources of the constitutional conflict). 
21 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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“compelling business necessity” standard is warranted for 
government defendants in light of the remedial or regulatory 
functions they often perform in the housing industry. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE 
A. Foundations in Employment 
The Supreme Court first recognized the concept of disparate 
impact as a basis for liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (“1964 Act”) in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.22 Although the 
words “disparate impact” never appeared in the original version of the 
1964 Act, the Griggs Court found that the language of section 
703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an employer to “limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race,”23 demonstrated a congressional intent to prohibit 
practices producing a disparate effect on members of certain groups. 
Noting that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the 
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation,”24 
the Court held that the Act proscribes not only overt discrimination 
but also practices that are “fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation.”25 While this reading of Title VII was once largely 
criticized,26 Congress never overruled it. Instead, when Congress 
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 it codified Title 
VII’s disparate impact standard by placing those words into the 
statute, and by addressing the mechanics of a disparate impact 
claim.28 As amended, the statute provides: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact 
is established under this title only if— 
                                                                                                                 
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006)) (emphasis added).  
24 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
25 Id. at 431. 
26 See e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987) (arguing that such a reading was “extremely 
strained”). 
27 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2006)). 
28 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 507 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 
1074). 
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(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race . . . and the respondent fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party . . . [identifies an adequate] 
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to 
adopt such an alternative employment practice.29 
While the Supreme Court once required plaintiffs to carry the 
burden of persuasion on the issue of business necessity,30 the 1991 
Act affirmatively placed that burden on the defendant.31 Under the 
current version of the statute, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case, and must show that the employer’s 
practices produce a disparate impact on members of a certain group. 
In the employment context, plaintiffs can only satisfy this burden by 
showing that three factors are satisfied.32 First, the plaintiff must 
identify the specific employment practice that is challenged. Second, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice has an adverse impact 
on a specific class of persons protected by Title VII. Finally, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s practice actually caused the 
disparate impact in question, which means the plaintiff “must offer 
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the 
[employment] practice in question has caused the exclusion of 
applicants . . . because of their membership in a protected group.”33 If 
a plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to show that the employment practice has a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.34 If the defendant 
successfully proves that the challenged practice serves a business 
necessity, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff, who 
                                                                                                                 
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
30 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). For a discussion of the “business 
necessity” defense under Title VII, see infra Part IV.A. 
32 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, 
J.) (plurality opinion). 
33 Id. While the 1991 Act overruled the Supreme Court’s decision to allocate the burden 
of persuasion on the issue of business necessity to the plaintiffs, it simply codified the Court’s 
articulation of the standards for a prima facie case of disparate impact. George Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2316–17 (2006). See also Mahoney, supra note 6, at 457 (noting that 
Wards Cove remains good law on points other than its allocation of the burden of persuasion on 
business necessity to plaintiffs). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
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must prove that alternative practices that do not produce the same 
racial effect are available and would “serve the employer’s legitimate 
interests” just as well.35 
B. Disparate Impact under Title VIII: Fact or Fiction? 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 makes it unlawful to 
“refuse to sell or rent . . . a dwelling to any person because of race.”36 
While this language is recognized as a prohibition on disparate 
treatment or intentional racial discrimination,37 the Supreme Court 
has never ruled on whether Title VIII’s antidiscrimination provisions 
extend beyond actions taken with a discriminatory purpose to 
practices that merely produce a discriminatory effect on members of a 
protected class.38 However, all of the federal circuit courts to address 
the question have allowed disparate impact recovery under Title 
VIII.39 While this fact is not determinative of how the Supreme Court 
would rule,40 it nonetheless provides support for the proposition. The 
following sections will outline how various indicators, including 
principles of statutory construction, congressional intent, and 
Supreme Court precedent, support the existence of a disparate impact 
standard under Title VIII. 
1. Principles of Statutory Construction 
Many proponents of a Title VIII disparate impact standard 
emphasize the statute’s “because of race” language that also appears 
in Title VII.41 These proponents reason that because the Supreme 
Court has recognized such language as giving rise to a disparate 
                                                                                                                 
35 Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (quoting Abemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1975)). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). While Title VIII also prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of “color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” id., this Note will focus primarily on 
race-based discrimination. 
37 While “disparate treatment” and “intentional discrimination” may have once carried 
two separate meanings, the terms have become virtually interchangeable. See Primus, Future, 
supra note 12, at 1351–52 n.56 (noting that the term “disparate treatment” covers “both formal 
differences in the treatment of people of different groups and unlawful employer motives”) 
(emphasis added)). 
38 Additionally, Title VIII contains no express language referencing a disparate impact 
standard. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (codifying disparate impact under Title 
VII). 
39 See sources cited supra note 8. 
40 See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228 (2005)). 
41 See Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 
1274, 1282 (Ind. 2008) (“Because Title VII and the FHA use the same language in prohibiting 
discrimination, we should apply the same framework to both.”). 
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impact claim in the employment context,42 principles of statutory 
construction suggest that the “because of race” language used in Title 
VIII also gives rise to a claim of disparate impact.43 Until recently, 
this argument was tempered by the fact that the same “because of” 
language also appears in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”),44 which many lower courts have declined to interpret as 
encompassing a disparate impact standard.45 However, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson has virtually eliminated 
this problem.46 
In Smith, the Court held that the ADEA does encompass a cause of 
action for disparate impact.47 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied heavily on principles of statutory construction, particularly the 
premise that “when Congress uses the same language in two statutes 
having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after 
the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text 
to have the same meaning in both statutes.”48 After characterizing its 
finding of disparate impact under Title VII in Griggs as “precedent of 
compelling importance,”49 the Court went on to explain that neither 
Title VII nor the ADEA merely prohibit actions that expressly “limit, 
segregate, or classify” persons based on race.50 Instead, both 
                                                                                                                 
42 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
43 See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 199, 222 (1978) (“[T]hese employment cases suggest that a discriminatory effect 
theory should be adopted in appropriate private Title VIII cases as well.”). 
44 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)(2006) (”It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s age.”) (emphasis added). 
45 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 507 n.53 (citing Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 
73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732–
43 (3d. Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076–78 (7th Cir. 1994)). It 
is important to note, however, that these cases were decided after the Court’s decision in Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), where Justice Kennedy noted in a concurring 
opinion that “nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA 
context the so-called ‘disparate impact theory’ of Title VII . . . .” Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Prior to this pronouncement, there had been little doubt among lower courts that 
the ADEA did encompass a disparate impact standard. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID 
D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 416 n.16 (2003) (listing pre-Hazen 
Paper decisions from Courts of Appeals recognizing a disparate impact standard under the 
ADEA). 
46 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
47 Id. at 240. 
48 Id. at 233 (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 
(1973) (per curiam)). 
49 Id. at 234. 
50 Id. at 235. 
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prohibitions extend to actions that “otherwise adversely affect [a 
person’s] status as an employee.”51  
Similarly, the language of Title VIII extends beyond overt acts of 
discrimination to reach actions that “otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.”52 Like Title VII and 
the ADEA, this language focuses on the effects of a practice rather 
than the actor’s motivation.53 Therefore, the Court’s logic in Smith 
should apply with equal force to Title VIII, and the language 
similarities between Title VII and Title VIII thus support a conclusion 
that Title VIII includes a disparate impact standard.  
2. Legislative Purpose 
Despite the strong indications that the language similarities 
between Title VII and Title VIII support recognition of a disparate 
impact under Title VIII, at least one critic has noted that the language 
of Title VII “has never been the real source of disparate impact 
doctrine.”54 Moreover, the Court itself has even recognized that its 
“opinion in Griggs relied primarily on the purposes of the Act,” rather 
than on its reading of the statutory text.55 This suggests that 
similarities in statutory language may not suffice as the sole basis for 
finding a disparate impact standard under Title VIII. Therefore, courts 
should also analyze the Congressional motives behind Title VIII to 
help determine whether Congress intended to impose a disparate 
impact standard.  
In its first Title VIII opinion,56 the Court drew from the legislative 
history and determined that the Congressional purpose behind Title 
VIII was to achieve “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”57 
Classifying housing integration as a “policy that Congress considered 
to be of the highest priority,”58 the Court held that Title VIII should 
                                                                                                                 
51 Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988)). The Watson 
Court explained that employer actions that produce a disparate impact may be said to “adversely 
affect” an individual’s status as an employee. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
53 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 234 (“Congress . . . ‘directed the thrust of the Act to the 
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971))). 
54 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 506.  
55 Smith, 544 U.S. at 235. However, the Court also noted that it later recognized the 
Griggs holding as an appropriate reading of the statutory text. Id. (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 
991). 
56 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
57 Id. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)). 
58 Id. 
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be broadly construed in order to achieve that goal.59 Notably, the 
Court based its conclusion on a Title VII decision,60 and many lower 
courts since then have followed this lead. In particular, the Second 
Circuit in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington61 relied 
on the Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Griggs, and held that a 
Title VIII violation could be established based solely on disparate 
impact.62 According to the Huntington court, it is appropriate to 
interpret both statutes in a similar manner because they are “part of a 
coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end 
discrimination; [and] the Supreme Court has held that both statutes 
must be construed expansively to implement that goal.”63 Thus, the 
court concluded that achievement of Title VIII’s stated purpose 
“requires a discriminatory effect standard; an intent requirement 
would strip the statute of all impact on de facto segregation.”64 Under 
this reading, the similar goals behind Title VII and Title VIII support 
the conclusion that disparate impact is a vital component of Title 
VIII’s provisions. 
3. The Arlington Heights Ruling 
In addition to statutory construction and indicators of legislative 
intent, the Supreme Court’s decision in Metropolitan Development 
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I)65 supports 
an inference that the Court would recognize a disparate impact cause 
of action under the statute if confronted with the issue. In Arlington 
Heights, the plaintiffs brought housing discrimination claims under 
both Title VIII and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.66 When the Seventh Circuit decided only the equal 
protection claim, the Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the case 
for consideration of the Title VIII claim as well.67 While the Court 
has never expressly ruled on whether Title VIII encompasses a 
disparate impact cause of action, critics have inferred that the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
59 Id. at 212. 
60 Id. at 209 (relying on the holding in Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d 
Cir. 1971)). 
61 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).  
62 Id. at 935. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 934 (citing John Stick, Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the 
Fair Housing Act: A Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398, 406 (1979)). 
65 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
66 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
67 Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 253. 
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remand for of the Title VIII claim indicated the Justice’s belief that a 
different analytical framework should apply depending on whether a, 
claim is brought under equal protection or under Title VIII.68  
C. In Search of a Proper Test: Competing Standards 
While it is now almost universally accepted that Title VIII 
encompasses a cause of action under disparate impact theory,69 the 
proper test to apply in Title VIII cases involving disparate impact 
claims remains a major source of confusion. While the abundance of 
employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to Title VII has 
given courts and scholars ample opportunity to develop some 
consistency in that area of law, Title VIII doctrine remains relatively 
unexplored, creating substantial confusion with respect to the proper 
test for disparate impact doctrine in housing cases.70 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s silence on the issue, lower courts have articulated 
and applied a variety of standards. Particularly since Title VIII’s 
enactment in 1964, courts have drawn from two different and often 
conflicting lines of authority—equal protection principals and Title 
VII employment discrimination standards.71 From these lines of 
authority, the circuit courts have developed and applied two main 
tests to disparate impact claims—the balancing test developed in 
Arlington Heights II and Huntington, (“the balancing test”) and the 
burden-shifting analysis (“the burden-shifting test”) derived from 
Title VII’s statutory framework and its associated case law.72 
1. The Balancing Test 
Relying largely on the constitutional principle of equal protection, 
the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court to find liability under 
Title VIII based on discriminatory effect alone.73 Several early 
                                                                                                                 
68 See Schwemm, supra note 43, at 227 (“Arlington Heights is the strongest hint yet given 
by the Court that it would be appropriate to apply a [different] standard . . . in Title VIII 
cases.”). 
69 For a list of cases following this reasoning, see supra note 8. 
70 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 416 (discussing the lack of the courts’ and scholars’ 
understanding of the application of disparate impact in fair housing and lending laws). 
71 Id. at 425–26 (discussing the development of the authoritative dichotomy). 
72 Id. at 434, 437–38. 
73 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). While at least one 
commentator has described Black Jack as employing a balancing test, see Stick, supra note 64, 
at 416 (“[T]he Black Jack test incorporated a balancing component . . . .”), it is clear from the 
court’s discussion that it in fact conducted a burden-shifting analysis. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d 
at 1185 (“Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case . . . the burden shifts to the 
governmental defendant to [justify its practice].”). 
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decisions that followed the Eighth Circuit’s lead applied a quasi-
constitutional “balancing test” to claims of disparate impact under 
Title VIII.74 In Arlington Heights II,75 the Seventh Circuit identified 
four factors that courts should balance when evaluating a disparate 
impact claim: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of a 
discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the 
“defendant’s interest in taking the action complained of”; and (4) 
whether the “plaintiff seek[s] to compel the defendant to affirmatively 
provide housing,” or merely to remove obstacles (such as zoning 
restrictions) to private provision of such housing.76  
The Second Circuit revisited this test in Huntington Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of Huntington.77 While the Huntington court also 
applied a “balancing test,” it modified the Arlington Heights II factors 
in several important ways.78 For instance, rather than focusing on 
“absolute numbers” as evidence of discriminatory impact under the 
first factor, the Second Circuit looked instead to the proportion of a 
protected class affected by a defendant’s practice.79 The court also 
deferred less to the defendant’s interests, requiring that the action 
complained of serve a “bona fide and legitimate justification[],” and 
that no less restrictive alternatives exist.80 Finally, the Second Circuit 
entirely rejected the “intent” factor set forth in Arlington Heights II, 
reducing the number of pertinent factors to three.81 The Sixth and 
Tenth Circuits have adopted the Huntington approach, balancing only 
these three factors.82  
2. The Title VII Burden-Shifting Test 
Despite the early prevalence of the Arlington Heights II balancing 
test for Title VIII claims, many courts have recently shied away from 
this approach, looking instead to Title VII for guidance.83 
                                                                                                                 
74 See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Huntington Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 
(1988). 
75 558 F.2d 1283. 
76 Id. at 1290. 
77 844 F.2d 926. 
78 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 439–40 (discussing the Huntington court’s revisions). 
79 Huntington, 844 F.2d at 938. 
80 Id. at 939. 
81 Id. at 935 (“Practical concerns also militate against inclusion of intent in any disparate 
impact analysis.”). 
82 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 
1252 (10th Cir. 1995); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986). 
83 See, e.g., Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243; Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 
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Specifically, these courts have imported the burden-shifting 
framework from the employment discrimination decisions.84 The 
Third Circuit led the way in this regard with its opinion in Resident 
Advisory Board. v. Rizzo,85 where it applied Title VII’s version of the 
burden-shifting analysis to a Title VIII disparate impact claim.86 After 
analyzing the competing lines of disparate impact precedent, the court 
determined that Title VII standards should govern. The Fourth Circuit 
followed suit several years later in Betsey v. Turtle Creek 
Associates,87 abandoning its prior line of equal protection cases.88 
Notably, the court also recognized the difference between private and 
governmental defendants in the housing context, a distinction that 
will be further explored in Part IV. 
More recently, despite the Seventh Circuit’s continued application 
of the balancing test, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected that 
standard in favor of a burden-shifting framework,89 noting that “most 
federal circuits have abandoned the Arlington Heights factors 
altogether.”90 In discussing its reasons for choosing the burden-
shifting standard, the court pointed to evidentiary concerns. These 
concerns and others will be addressed in greater detail in Part III of 
this Note. As Part III will illustrate, such issues indicate that if 
disparate impact under Title VIII is to survive strict scrutiny in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
(4th Cir. 1984); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Villas West II of 
Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008). 
84 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30, 436 (1971) (analyzing the 
plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII). 
85 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). In Rizzo, the City of Philadelphia cancelled construction 
of a low-income housing project, and eligible persons sued under a disparate impact theory. The 
court found for plaintiffs based on a prima facie case and the absence of any justification by the 
city. Id. at 149.  
86 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 436. While the Eighth Circuit in Black Jack was the first to 
conduct a burden-shifting analysis, it did not employ the same version of the test as courts 
addressing Title VII claims. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit required the defendant to justify its 
action based on “compelling governmental interest,” a much higher standard than that required 
under Title VII. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974). 
87 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984). 
88 Id. at 987–88 (recognizing the “parallel objectives of Title VII and Title VIII”). 
89 Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 
1282 (Ind. 2008) (noting that while “[f]ederal district courts in the Seventh Circuit are of course 
obligated to follow Seventh Circuit precedent, including Arlington Heights II,” state courts “are 
not so restricted”). 
90 Id. at 1281 (citing Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th 
Cir. 2005); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003); Lapid-Laurel, 
L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002); Langlois v. Abington Hous. 
Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 
293 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
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event of a constitutional challenge,91 it must formally adopt the 
burden-shifting analysis and abandon the balancing test. 
II. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:  
A POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
A. Disparate Impact and Equal Protection 
In addition to the confusion among lower courts over the proper 
test to apply in Title VIII disparate impact cases, the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Ricci v. DeStefano92 has added another variable to 
the mix—a potential conflict between disparate impact doctrine and 
the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.93 In the past four decades, several rounds of legal 
questions have arisen regarding the relationship between these two 
doctrines.94 In the first round, the main concern of courts and 
commentators was whether an equal protection challenge could be 
sustained on the basis of discriminatory effects alone.95 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis answered this question in the 
negative, holding that an equal protection challenge would only be 
sustained upon a showing of discriminatory intent.96 The Court did, 
however, empower the legislatures to impose statutory disparate 
impact standards.97  
The second round of legal questions regarding the relationship 
between disparate impact and equal protection involved the source of 
authority for statutes prohibiting facially neutral practices that 
produce a discriminatory effect.98 Specifically, courts and 
commentators struggled with whether such statues were “valid only 
as commerce legislation or also as a means of enforcing equal 
protection under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”99 While 
                                                                                                                 
91 See infra Part II. 
92 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
93 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person in its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). While not expressly stated, the same provision 
has been read into the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government. See Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). In Sharpe, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the District of Columbia from maintaining 
segregated schools, noting that “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would 
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government,” than the Fourteenth Amendment imposed 
upon the States. Id. at 500. 
94 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 494. 
95 Id. at 494–95. 
96 Id. at 495 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 495.  
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this series of questions remains largely unresolved,100 a third question 
has arisen in recent years—whether, instead of serving as a source of 
authority for disparate impact statutes, the Equal Protection clause 
may in fact prohibit statutes that impose disparate impact 
standards,101 as they may compel the kinds of racial classifications 
that equal protection forbids.102  
Until recently, this third question was merely academic. In light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci, however, it appears that 
“what was once academic speculation is now judicially actionable.”103 
Although Ricci marks the Supreme Court’s first consideration of the 
possible conflict between Equal Protection and disparate impact, this 
does not mean that such a conflict did not previously exist.104 
Moreover, while Ricci involved an employment discrimination claim, 
it raises issues that apply to virtually all areas of antidiscrimination 
law, such as whether “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens,”105 or whether the 
Constitution is color-conscious, such that “[i]n order to get beyond 
racism, we must first take account of race.”106 In light of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on disparate treatment (absent a 
compelling state interest), Ricci also raises questions over when it is 
permissible, if ever, to “intentionally discriminate in order to avoid 
the unintended discrimination that might otherwise result from 
facially neutral policies.”107  
B. Ricci v. DeStefano: The Case and Controversy 
In Ricci, several firefighters (seventeen whites and one Hispanic) 
brought suit against the New Haven, Connecticut, Civil Service 
Commission when the Commission refused to certify the results of a 
                                                                                                                 
100 Id. at 495 n.4. 
101 Id. at 495. 
102 Id. 
103 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1343. 
104 See Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 
2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. (August 26, 2009) at 18, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1462431 (observing that the absence of consideration does not mean that such a conflict did not 
previously exist). 
105 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
106 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978). 
107 Marcus, supra note 104, at 2. While the Court plainly held that such intentional 
discrimination was impermissible under the circumstances in Ricci, it left open the possibility 
that race-conscious actions may be appropriate in certain instances, such as where an employer 
could establish a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate impact liability would result in the 
absence of race conscious measures. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. 
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promotional exam in the City’s fire department.108 The fire 
department administered the exam in order to select candidates for 
promotion to fill eight vacant senior positions.109 When the results 
were tabulated, the top-ten scores went to white candidates, meaning 
that certification of the results would ensure that no black candidates 
would receive promotions.110 Seeking to avoid liability for 
discrimination under the disparate impact provision of Title VII, the 
Commission threw out the results of the test.111 Accordingly, several 
white and hispanic firefighters who would have received promotions 
had the results been certified brought suit under Title VII and the 
Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the Commission had 
discriminated against them on the basis of race.112 New Haven argued 
in defense that its decision to discard the results was based on a good-
faith belief that if the Commission had certified the results, it would 
have been found liable under Title VII’s disparate impact provision, 
for adopting a practice with negative impacts on minority 
firefighters.113 The Second Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for the City.114 
Reversing the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court held in 
favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that New Haven’s ace-based decision 
making violates Title VII.115 Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-
justice majority, expressly rejected the city’s argument that race-
based actions may be justified by a “good-faith belief” that those 
actions are necessary to avoid liability under disparate impact.116 
Allowing such a justification would “amount to a de facto quota 
system, in which a ‘focus on statistics . . . could put undue pressure 
on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.’”117  
Therefore, instead of the proposed “good faith belief” standard, the 
Court applied a new “strong basis in evidence,” standard, which, 
according to Justice Kennedy, would allow disparate treatment in the 
                                                                                                                 





113 Id. at 2671. 
114 Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the civil service board’s 
actions were protected because the board attempted to comply with its Title VII obligations). 
115 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664. 
116 Id. at 2675 (“A minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of lawful 
and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is little if any evidence of disparate-
impact discrimination.”). 
117 Id. (quoting Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality 
opinion)). 
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name of avoiding disparate impact under Title VII only when the 
defendants could show a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate 
impact liability would result.118 Still, Kennedy observed that New 
Haven had not satisfied this test, noting “a threshold showing of a 
significant statistical disparity and nothing more—is far from a strong 
basis in evidence that the City would have been liable” under 
disparate impact theory.119 As a result, the Court rejected New 
Haven’s arguments that its actions were necessary to avoid disparate 
impact liability, and held that New Haven had violated Title VII’s 
prohibition on disparate treatment.120 
Notably, the Court avoided addressing the constitutional 
dilemma,121 “merely postpon[ing] the evil day” when the Court must 
decide “[w]hether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact 
provisions . . . consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection.”122 By deciding the case upon statutory principles alone, 
the Court developed what Richard Primus calls “the Ricci premise,” 
framing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine as the exception to Title 
VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment.123 The Court’s analysis 
indicates that disparate treatment may be acceptable under Title VII, 
particularly in cases where disparate treatment is necessary to avoid 
imposing disparate effects on racial groups.124 While this analysis 
seems to reconcile disparate impact with disparate treatment by 
recognizing a statutory carve-out,125 the question of constitutionality 
remains.  
While the Court articulated its opinion as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the constitutional implications of Ricci cannot be 
ignored. As Primus describes, the Court’s treatment of disparate 
impact as the exception to Title VII’s prohibition on disparate 
treatment indicates the Court’s recognition of an inherent conflict 
between the two doctrines, absent a judicially-created exception.126 
                                                                                                                 
118 Id. at 2675–76 (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)). 
119 Id. at 2678 (citation omitted). 
120 Id. at 2681. 
121 Id. at 2676 (noting that the Court’s analysis says nothing about equal protection); see 
also Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1342 (classifying the Court’s decision against ruling on 
the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as a “gesture of constitutional avoidance”). 
122 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
123 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1343. 
124 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (holding that an employer may take race-conscious 
measures only when there is a “strong basis in evidence” that disparate impact liability will 
result if the employer does not take the race-conscious action). 
125 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1344. 
126 Id. at 1355 (“If administering the disparate impact doctrine would be a disparate 
treatment problem but for the statutory carve-out, it is also an equal protection problem.”). 
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Moreover, the similarities between the disparate treatment and equal 
protection doctrines127 suggest that “[a] conflict between disparate 
impact and disparate treatment is also a conflict between disparate 
impact and equal protection.”128 While this reading of Ricci appears to 
view traditional antidiscrimination law through a virtual looking 
glass,129 recent changes in equal protection jurisprudence demonstrate 
the increasingly suspect nature of any policy or statute “that places 
people in racial categories and measures liability in part by reference 
to the allocation of . . . opportunities among those racial groups.”130 
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s rulings in City of Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co.,131 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,132 and Gratz v. 
Bollinger133 show that equal protection has become less tolerant of 
government actions that classify individuals by race and allocate 
benefits on that basis, even when such action is intended to remedy 
past discrimination.134 Thus, assuming that “the war between 
disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or 
later . . . it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what 
terms—to make peace between them.”135 In order to forge this peace, 
it may first be necessary to examine the potential sources of 
conflict.136  
                                                                                                                 
127 See id. at 1363 (explaining that the prevailing view is that Title VII is race conscious 
while equal protection is “colorblind”).  
128 Id. at 1344.  
129 See Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 495 (recognizing that the possibility “that 
equal protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact standards 
departs significantly from settled ways of thinking about antidiscrimination law.” (emphasis 
added)). 
130 Id. at 496.  
131 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a municipal program which 
allocated benefits disproportionately to minority subcontractors). 
132 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasizing the Fourteenth Amendment’s focus on the 
individual, not groups, as the proper unit of analysis). 
133 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down an undergraduate affirmative action policy where 
race was an overwhelming factor in admissions decisions). 
134 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 496. 
135 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1355 (noting that because “Title VII, as a statute, must give 
way to the Constitution,” the statutorily-derived exception that saved disparate impact doctrine 
from conflict with disparate treatment doctrine will not save disparate impact from a 
constitutional challenge, which means that “some other defense” of disparate impact doctrine 
must be found). 
136 See Marcus, supra note 104, at 10 (separating the conflict into three categories: racial 
classification, illicit motives, and racially allocated benefits). 
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1. Disparate Impact Encourages Government Actors to  
Classify Based on Race 
At its most basic level, the Court’s decision in Ricci demonstrates 
that disparate impact doctrine may cause employers and housing 
providers “driven by compliance concerns to classify their employees 
and candidates by race [and allocate benefits on that basis] in order to 
avoid the prospect of disparate-impact liability.”137 The constitutional 
conflict that arises from this situation is most obvious where the 
affected employer or housing provider is itself a government entity,138 
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that any federal or state 
action that classifies individuals based on race is presumptively 
unconstitutional.139 Thus, one source of conflict between disparate 
impact and equal protection is the untenable position of government 
entities seeking to avoid both disparate impact and equal protection 
liability. 
However, under this formulation, the constitutional conflict 
between disparate impact and equal protection becomes virtually non-
existent in cases involving private employers or housing providers, 
whose actions are, by definition, outside the reach of equal 
protection.140 Under this view, a private employer’s acts of intentional 
discrimination, taken for purposes of avoiding violating Title VII,141 
would not give rise to a constitutional cause of action, and a court 
could avoid the issue altogether. 
However, the conflict between disparate impact and equal 
protection may nonetheless extend to cases involving private 
defendants, as disparate impact doctrine may itself constitute a “racial 
classification.” Under such an analysis, a constitutional conflict 
would exist regardless of whether the defendant is a private or 
                                                                                                                 
137 Id. at 10–11 (noting that this risk is greatest in cases where it is cheaper for an employer 
or housing provider to use racial preferences than to adjust policies which produce the 
discriminatory effects complained of); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 4 (3d ed. 
2008) (noting that economically rational business owners who “otherwise would be inclined to 
minimize unfair practices do not in fact do so because of the costs of controlling prejudiced or 
arbitrary agents”). 
138 See, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (employer was the City of New Haven, Connecticut). 
139 Such race-based classifications can only survive if narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (state government 
action); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (federal government action).  
140 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person in its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)). 
141 In light of the Ricci premise, such an employer would remain free of any liability if she 
could prove, by a strong basis in evidence, that disparate impact liability would result but for the 
discriminatory actions. 
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governmental entity, as the conflict would stem from Congress’s 
impermissible use of race in enacting a statute containing a disparate 
impact provision. 
2. Disparate Impact Is a Racial Classification in and of Itself 
If the existence of a racial classification could be based on 
statutory language alone, it would be difficult to argue disparate 
impact doctrine is itself a racial classification.142 In contrast to the 
affirmative action programs in Adarand and Croson, neither Title VII 
nor Title VIII explicitly names particular racial groups.143 However, a 
more proper understanding of the concept of express classifications 
recognizes that formal statutory language is not determinative as to 
whether a statute in fact operates as a racial classification.144 For 
example, in 2001, the D.C. Circuit struck down an FCC regulatory 
scheme that required broadcast licensees to institute employment 
outreach measures, and to report the race and sex of each job 
applicant to the FCC.145 Upon determining that the rule placed 
“official pressure upon [private] broadcasters to recruit minority 
candidates,” the court held that the rule constituted “a race-based 
classification that is not narrowly tailored to support a compelling 
governmental interest.”146 As Richard Primus observes, this decision 
reflects the notion that courts facing a statute that seems 
“constitutionally problematic” will often “reason[] backwards” to 
determine that some portion of the statute constitutes an express 
classification.147 
In light of this interpretation of the “express classification” 
doctrine, even if disparate impact statutes do not explicitly classify 
individuals based on race, courts could nevertheless interpret them as 
                                                                                                                 
142 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 508 (“Whether anything [in the language of 
Title VII] amounts to an express classification is a difficult question to answer.”). 
143 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the state gave contractors 
incentives to hire minority-owned subcontractors and based the status “minority owned” on 
racial classifications. In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality 
opinion), the state required that 30% of a contractor's subcontractors be owned by “Blacks, 
Spanish -speaking, Orientals, Eskimos, or Aleuts.” Id. at 478. 
144 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 509. 
145 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold 
that [the rule] violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”).  
146 Id. at 15. Like Title VII and Title VIII, the rule never mentioned specific racial groups. 
147 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 509. Primus does not suggest that such courts 
are acting improperly. Instead, he suggests only that “‘express racial classification’ functions as 
a term of art that encompasses a mix of descriptive and normative elements” instead of relying 
on formal statutory language. Id. 
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express racial classifications that violate equal protection. In light of 
Ricci, it has become apparent that disparate impact places the same 
“pressure” on third parties to allocate resources based on race as the 
FCC regulation in MD Broadcasters. In this respect, courts could 
easily conclude that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII and 
Title VIII constitute “express racial classifications,” such that a 
constitutional conflict exists regardless of the private or governmental 
nature of the decision maker in a given case. 
III. BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS:  
THE SURVIVAL OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
Despite these conflicts between disparate impact and equal 
protection, the Court’s decision in Ricci need not signal the death of 
disparate impact doctrine. Rather, the two doctrines may be 
reconciled, depending on how the courts interpret Ricci and how they 
frame disparate impact doctrine in the future.148 Unless the Supreme 
Court is willing to completely invalidate disparate impact on 
constitutional grounds, it will be forced, sooner rather than later, to 
find a compromise between the two doctrines. Regardless of the 
ultimate outcome of this debate, the need for such an agreement may 
offer valuable guidance for courts and scholars seeking to determine 
the most useful test for disparate impact under Title VIII. 
A. Disparate Impact and Strict Scrutiny 
At its most basic level, the conflict between disparate impact and 
equal protection centers on the race-conscious nature of disparate 
impact statutes, and the pressure it places on employers and housing 
providers to take race-conscious measures that the Constitution would 
otherwise prohibit. In this respect, the disparate impact creates racial 
classifications (both directly and indirectly) and allocates benefits on 
that basis.149 Because equal protection subjects such classifications to 
strict scrutiny, it is possible that disparate impact will only survive if 
the Court holds that statutory prohibitions on disparate impact satisfy 
strict scrutiny review.150 
                                                                                                                 
148 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1363, 1369. Primus proposes three potential 
readings of Ricci, including the “general reading,” the “institutional reading,” and the “visible 
victims reading.” Id. at 1362. According to Primus, if either of the latter readings prevail, 
disparate impact may be directly reconciled with equal protection. However, under the “general 
reading,” equal protection may only be saved by recognition of a compelling government 
interest. Id. at 1363.  
149 See supra Part II.B. 
150 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1374–75 (describing methods by which disparate 
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While strict scrutiny was once thought to be “strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact,”151 the Court disproved of this characterization in Grutter 
v. Bollinger152 by upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s 
admissions policy. Despite the race-conscious nature of the policy, 
the Court found student body diversity to be a compelling state 
interest, at least “in the context of higher education,” where inclusion 
of different views and backgrounds is crucial to the learning 
experience.153 
The Grutter decision thus provides strong support for the idea that 
certain race-conscious measures are constitutionally permissible, so 
long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest. This notion, when coupled with the Ricci premise,154 further 
suggests that one way to reconcile disparate impact with equal 
protection is to find that disparate impact doctrine serves a 
compelling government interest, and is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that end.155 Such an approach is consistent with the Court’s analysis 
in Ricci, as it would effectively “carve out” disparate impact as the 
exception to equal protection’s prohibition on racial classifications, 
just as the Court “carved out” an exception to the disparate treatment 
doctrine. Thus, even if Ricci is interpreted as recognizing a direct 
conflict between disparate impact and equal protection,156 disparate 
impact may still survive if such an interest exists.157  
                                                                                                                 
 
impact can survive a strict scrutiny analysis based on equal protection). However, Primus 
suggests that this proposition should only apply if the “general reading” of Ricci prevails. If an 
alternate reading prevails, however, disparate impact may not need to satisfy strict scrutiny in 
order to survive a constitutional challenge. Id.  
151 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980)). 
152 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative 
action admissions policy as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest). 
153 Id. at 328. 
154 The “Ricci premise” recognizes that disparate impact doctrine operates as an exception 
to the disparate treatment doctrine, thus saving disparate impact doctrine from a potential 
conflict with Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment. See Primus, Future, supra note 12, 
at 1384. 
155 See id. at 1375 (proposing that the equal protection problem may be “parried by 
showing that the doctrine is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest”). 
156 This is what Primus describes as the “general reading” of Ricci. Primus, Future, supra 
note 12, at 1363. Under the “general reading” of Ricci, disparate impact doctrine conflicts with 
equal protection by forcing racial classifications and allocation of benefits based on group 
membership, which equal protection forbids. Primus also proposes two alternative readings of 
Ricci. Id. at 1364–74. Under the “institutional reading,” and the “visible victims reading,” 
disparate impact and equal protection would not conflict, even absent a compelling government 
interest. Id. at 1374–75. 
157 Id. at 1384–85 (Title VII’s prohibition on practices that produce a disparate impact will 
be constitutional if the Court concludes that they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
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B. Compelling Government Interests 
If disparate impact is to survive within a strict scrutiny framework, 
questions arise over what compelling interests, if any, may justify a 
government measure designed to force certain racial classifications. 
While the Court has recognized that promotion of diversity may be a 
compelling state interest,158 it has not recognized this interest outside 
the context of higher education. Moreover, because the admissions 
policy upheld in Grutter considered “a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin 
[was] but a single though important element,”159 the Court might be 
less likely to recognize “an interest in simple ethnic diversity.”160 
However, several authors have suggested that Grutter’s emphasis on 
society’s need for citizens familiar with a wide variety of diverse 
viewpoints may be transferred outside the higher education context.161 
One commentator has also suggested that the Grutter rationale may 
apply in a residential context as well.162 Still, whether courts will 
extend Grutter beyond the college admissions context remains 
unclear,163 and even under such an extension, race could not be the 
only consideration.164 
In the event that a government’s interest in diversity cannot justify 
disparate impact, it may be able to advance two alternative 
compelling interests.165 These include an interest in ferreting out 
instances of intentional discrimination (the “evidentiary interest”), 
                                                                                                                 
 
government interest). 
158 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(“The freedom of a [state] university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body.”). 
159 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). 
160 Id. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 539 U.S. at 315). 
161 See Adam Gordon, Making Exclusionary Zoning Remedies Work: How Courts 
Applying Title VII Standards to Fair Housing Cases Have Misunderstood the Housing Market, 
24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 437, 463 (2006) (citing Cynthia E. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: 
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1 (2005)) (considering how Grutter might apply beyond the academic context); Eric A. 
Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451 (2004) (discussing Grutter’s effects on affirmative action); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 
115 YALE L. J. 1408 (2006) (using Title VII to evaluate Grutter). 
162 Gordon, supra note 161, at 463 (citing Josh Whitehead, Using Disparate Impact 
Analysis to Strike Down Exclusionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L. J. 359, 395 (2005)). 
163 Id. 
164 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (holding that universities may consider race as one of 
many factors when making admissions decisions, but that it may not be the exclusive factor). 
165 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1368–75. 
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and an interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination statutes, 
including Title VII and Title VIII (the “compliance interest”).166 
While the compliance interest may only be useful in defending the 
race-conscious actions taken by governmental entities in an effort to 
avoid disparate impact liability, the evidentiary interest may be 
sufficient to save disparate impact doctrine as a whole from 
constitutional invalidation.167 
However, if disparate impact is to be justified by this evidentiary 
interest, it must be narrowly construed. At least one critic has argued 
that disparate impact is only compatible with equal protection when it 
is construed as a means of rooting out instances of intentional 
discrimination.168 Therefore, while disparate impact has been 
construed as both an evidentiary tool designed to “root out” 
intentional discrimination and a mechanism to remedy the effects of 
past discrimination,169 the doctrine is most likely to be justified by a 
compelling government interest when viewed as an “evidentiary 
dragnet.”170 While the Supreme Court has already rejected the notion 
that redressing general trends of past discrimination could serve as a 
compelling government interest,171 the government’s interest in 
preventing intentional discrimination “seems compelling as a 
consensus matter.”172 As Richard Primus observed pre-Ricci, 
“[a]dopting an [evidentiary dragnet] interpretation . . . would help 
preserve disparate impact doctrine against an equal protection attack 
by making it conform to the presentist, individualist approach that 
increasingly typifies equal protection itself.”173 
The evidentiary dragnet view of disparate impact, while less 
ambitious than views that treat the doctrine as a remedy for past 
                                                                                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1375–76. Primus notes that if the general reading of Ricci prevails, recognition of 
a compelling evidentiary interest is the disparate impact doctrine’s only chance for survival. Id. 
168 See Marcus, supra note 104, at 3 (arguing that Title VII must be narrowed to exclude 
disparate impact or must be struck down as unconstitutional). 
169 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 520–21. Under the “evidentiary dragnet” view 
of disparate impact, Title VII and Title VIII are mainly concerned with punishing instances of 
present, intentional discrimination. In contrast, proponents who view disparate impact as a 
means of remedying past discrimination argue that the doctrine is equally, if not more, 
concerned with breaking down the racial hierarchies that have resulted from past discrimination. 
Id. 
170 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1375–76.  
171 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(“[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot 
justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.”). 
172 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1377. 
173 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 499. 
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discrimination,174 finds support in a number of sources, including the 
Supreme Court’s original disparate impact decision.175 In Griggs, the 
defendant employer had a history of openly discriminating on the 
basis of race, only permitting black employees to work in the Labor 
Department, which paid the lowest out of all five departments within 
the company.176 Following Congress’s passage of the 1964 Act, 
however, the employer eliminated this overtly discriminatory 
practice, and instead adopted a policy of requiring a high school 
education for applicants seeking promotion from the Labor 
department.177 The company also instituted a policy requiring that 
initial applicants and candidates for promotion obtain a minimum 
score on an achievement test. While facially neutral, the Court struck 
down these policies, noting that they effectively carried out the 
employer’s previous discriminatory policy; neutrality was simply a 
guise.178 
The facts of Griggs suggest that the Supreme Court first 
recognized disparate impact doctrine in an effort to impose liability 
where the discriminatory acts were almost certainly intentional, but 
where such intent was impossible to prove. Griggs also shows that 
given the difficulties of proving discriminatory intent, disparate 
impact doctrine is necessary as a means of uncovering and imposing 
liability for discriminatory motives,179 particularly where defendants 
use practices that appear facially neutral in order to achieve a 
discriminatory goal.180 During the early developments of 
antidiscrimination law, “prohibitions against [only] intentional 
discrimination could not address the more subtle forms of 
                                                                                                                 
174 See Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1378 (explaining that the evidentiary dragnet 
view is only a temporary solution to challenges against disparate treatment claims). 
175 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
176 Id. at 427 (noting that the highest paying jobs in the Labor Department paid less than 
the lowest paying jobs in the other four departments, where only whites were permitted to 
work). 
177 Id. The company also had an existing policy which required a high school education for 
initial assignment to any department other than Labor. Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 519. As Primus observes, this view of disparate 
impact parallels the constitutional principle that strict scrutiny review serves as a means of 
“smok[ing] out” the legislature’s true intent in taking measures that create racial classifications. 
Id. at 520 n.113 (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). 
180 See Elliot M. Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title 
VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 151 (1976) (noting that “only the careless 
landlord or employer who wishes to discriminate will leave clues” as to their true motive); see 
also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[C]lever men 
may easily conceal their [discriminatory] motivations.”). 
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discrimination that grew up in their place.”181 The fact that courts 
today rarely grant relief against a defendant without a suspicion of 
discriminatory intent further supports the conclusion that intentional 
discrimination is indeed the real focus of disparate impact,182 and that 
a proper formulation of the doctrine under Title VIII should reflect 
that concern. 
C. Narrow Tailoring: Searching for a Perfect Fit 
Assuming that disparate impact serves a compelling government 
interest in detecting and deterring intentional discrimination, 
questions still remain over whether the racial classifications embodied 
within the doctrine183 can be “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest. 
In the context of racial classifications, narrow tailoring requires “the 
most exact connection” between the race-conscious measures and the 
compelling government interest.184 Moreover, a statute cannot be 
over- or underinclusive in terms of the conduct it reaches, and the 
existence of nondiscriminatory alternatives seriously undercuts its 
legitimacy.185 This section will illustrate how a balancing test 
formulation of disparate impact can cause the doctrine to be both 
overinclusive—imposing liability where it may be undue under the 
evidentiary dragnet view of disparate impact—as well as 
underinclusive—often failing to reach conduct that should raise a 
presumption of discriminatory intent.  
Further, this section will illustrate the main thesis of this Note: if 
disparate impact must survive strict scrutiny in order to withstand the 
constitutional conflict presented by a general reading of Ricci, then a 
burden-shifting analysis is the most appropriate formulation of 
disparate impact. The burden-shifting test, including the timing and 
weight of the evidentiary burdens it places on both plaintiff and 
defendant, is crucial to ensuring that Title VIII’s disparate impact 
provisions are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in 
“smoking out” intentional discrimination. For the purposes of 
maintaining cohesion between disparate impact under Title VIII and 
                                                                                                                 
181 Rutherglen, Equality, supra note 33, at 2328. 
182 See Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 520 (“The fact that an adjudicating court 
does not enter a finding of intentional discrimination does not eliminate the possibility that 
intent is the doctrine’s real concern . . . .”).  
183 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing disparate impact as a racial classification). 
184 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing 
racial classifications as “too pernicious” to permit anything less than this close connection). 
185 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that in order to be narrowly tailored, a racial classification cannot be overly restrictive). 
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the principles of equal protection, a burden-shifting analysis is 
preferable to the balancing test, as it may reduce the pressure on 
housing providers to take race-conscious measures in order to avoid 
disparate impact liability. Moreover, the burden-shifting test’s high 
evidentiary standards will better enable courts to determine the true 
motives behind a defendant’s actions, and to impose liability only 
when a discriminatory motive is indicated.  
1. Problems with the Balancing Test 
Despite the merits of the balancing test for disparate impact,186 its 
continued application in Title VIII cases may prevent disparate 
impact doctrine from satisfying the “narrowly tailored” requirement 
of strict scrutiny. For instance, because the balancing test “attempt[s] 
to encapsulate in four simple questions all of the factors that should 
influence the outcome of a Title VIII case,” it often fails to capture 
the strength or importance of each party’s interest.187 For instance, 
while the third factor is said to measure the “defendant’s interest in 
the action,” it considers only the nature (legitimate or illegitimate) of 
a defendant’s interest, while ignoring the strength of that interest.188 
This factor also favors government over private interests, making it 
difficult for defendants—particularly private entities—to defend 
themselves, even when strong interests are involved. As a result, 
defendants with a strong legitimate interest in taking some action may 
have little hope of defending a successful prima facie case, which 
may in turn increase defendants’ motivation to adopt the type of 
“prophylactic measures” which gave rise to the controversy in Ricci. 
An additional problem with the balancing test is its treatment of 
the remedy a plaintiff seeks as relevant to the merits of a claim. Under 
the fourth factor articulated in Arlington Heights I, courts must 
consider whether the plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to 
affirmatively provide housing or simply to remove obstacles to access 
existing housing.189 This focus on the remedy is an “improper 
consideration[] in the disparate impact context,”190 where the harm 
inflicted (lack of access to housing) is the same, regardless of the 
                                                                                                                 
186 See supra Part II. 
187 Stick, supra note 64, at 410.  
188 Id. at 411. 
189 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S. 
252 (1977). This factor weighs against plaintiffs who seek to compel defendants to affirmatively 
provide housing. 
190 Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 1274, 
1282 (Ind. 2008). 
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remedy being sought. Moreover, because the fourth factor favors 
cases brought by private developers who seek to construct housing 
over those brought by prospective residents of such housing, the 
majority of successful cases against government defendants involve 
challenges to zoning ordinances that produce a discriminatory 
effect.191 The significance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that 
unlike many situations that arise in the employment context, many 
defendants in the housing context may have limited ability to grant 
meaningful relief.192 For instance, even where relief is granted against 
a municipality whose zoning ordinance produces a discriminatory 
effect, minorities may still be excluded from housing in a given area, 
because private sellers and landlords retain the ultimate power to 
grant or deny access to housing. By favoring cases where judicially 
granted remedies may have little practical effect on disadvantaged 
groups, racial inequalities in housing may continue despite a court’s 
imposition of liability under the balancing test standard.193 By causing 
a disconnect between the harm inflicted and the implementation of an 
appropriate remedy in this manner, a balancing-test version of 
disparate impact under Title VIII may prevent the doctrine from 
efficiently serving any compelling governmental interest. 
Finally, a number of developments have taken place in the housing 
market since the Arlington Heights II and Huntington decisions, 
creating a possibility that the balancing test no longer reflects the 
realities of the housing market.194 If this is the case, it may skew a 
court’s estimate of a practice’s impact on minority groups. For 
instance, courts applying the balancing test must evaluate the effects 
of a defendants’ practice by measuring what proportion of a given 
group will be adversely affected by that practice. In making this 
determination, courts often focus on income level as a proxy for an 
individual’s ability to access housing. In this respect, the balancing 
test assumes that if housing is made available to all persons of a given 
income level, it will be allocated randomly among those people, 
regardless of race.195 However, in recent decades, family wealth has 
become an increasingly prevalent factor in the homeownership 
market, and the importance of credit checks has risen significantly in 
                                                                                                                 
191 Gordon, supra note 161, at 451–52. 
192 Id. (noting that defendant employers often have direct authority to implement a remedy, 
such as using a different test or different employment criteria). 
193 Id. at 439 (“[E]ven once a remedy is formulated in a Title VIII case, the actual 
achievement of racial desegregation often remains in question.”). 
194 Id. at 448. 
195 Id.  
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both the rental and homeownership markets.196 Studies have shown, 
however, that members of minority groups tend to have lower credit 
scores than whites, and are less likely to receive financial assistance 
from family members when purchasing a home.197 Therefore, because 
a test that focuses on income alone will fail to measure the relative 
disadvantage that members of minority groups will face in accessing 
suitable housing, courts are likely to underestimate the 
disproportionate impact of a given housing practice on minority 
applicants.198 This creates a risk that courts will dismiss cases where 
the impact of a defendant's conduct—if properly measured—would 
raise a presumption of intentional discrimination. In such instances, 
disparate impact doctrine and the racial classifications it creates will 
fail to achieve the desired remedy of uncovering intentional 
discrimination, and therefore will not meet strict scrutiny’s narrow 
tailoring requirement. 
2. The Burden-Shifting Test and Evidentiary Standards 
As discussed in Part II, one of the main sources of conflict 
between disparate impact and equal protection is the possibility that 
employers and housing providers will adopt race-conscious quota 
systems and other “prophylactic” measures in order to avoid disparate 
liability.199 To make matters worse, a formulation of disparate impact 
that fails to capture the defendants’ interests (i.e., the balancing test) 
increases the likelihood that courts will impose liability on 
undeserving defendants.200 With little chance of defending their 
actions under a system which fails to appreciate their interests, 
potential defendants will be pressured to take race-conscious 
measures, such as throwing out valid employment tests,201 to avoid 
the possibility that a plaintiff could bring a disparate impact claim in 
the first place. However, as Justice O’Connor suggested nearly 20 
years ago, evidentiary mechanisms, including the prima facie case 
and proper allocations with respect to burdens of proof, may 
                                                                                                                 
196 Id. (citing John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 
316–18 (2000)). 
197 Id. at 450–51. 
198 See id. at 449 (“[T[he income-centered analyses . . . likely overstate the number of 
blacks who will receive housing . . . .”). 
199 See supra Part II. 
200 See supra Part III.C.1. 
201 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
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significantly reduce this “pressure . . . to adopt inappropriate 
prophylactic measures.”202  
Therefore, to the extent that the conflict between disparate impact 
and equal protection parallels the degree to which it encourages such 
measures, courts may be able to reduce one of the greatest points of 
conflict between disparate impact and equal protection by adhering to 
a test that employs these mechanisms. Because the burden-shifting 
analysis satisfies this need, courts addressing Title VIII claims would 
be well advised to adopt it as the proper test for the following reasons. 
First, by requiring plaintiffs to make out a full prima facie case 
before imposing any burden on the defendant, the burden-shifting 
standard reduces the pressure on defendants to adopt prophylactic 
measures as a means of avoiding disparate impact liability. While the 
balancing test operates less sequentially, requiring the defendant to 
incur costs from the beginning, the burden-shifting analysis ensures 
that the defendant will not incur significant litigation costs until after 
the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Therefore, in cases 
where a plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, the suit will be 
dismissed without any showing required from the defendant. By 
conditioning the defendant’s burden on the plaintiff’s initial success 
in this manner, the burden-shifting analysis should give defendants a 
greater sense of security against the threat and costs associated with 
defending frivolous claims. This security may in turn reduce the 
pressure on housing providers to adopt quota systems or other race-
conscious measures, thereby minimizing a major source of conflict 
between equal protection and disparate impact.  
Further, unlike the balancing test, which often fails to capture the 
strength of a defendant’s interest, the burden-shifting analysis gives 
potential defendants the opportunity to fully explain their actions, 
including the strength of their interests and the decision-making 
process they employed.203 This opportunity, combined with the 
possibility that a plaintiff’s case will fail before the defendant incurs 
any litigation costs, is more likely to assure would-be defendants that 
prophylactic measures are unnecessary to avoid disparate impact 
liability.204 In that respect, adoption of the burden-shifting standard in 
Title VIII cases may also deter housing providers from taking action 
                                                                                                                 
202 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, 
J.) (plurality opinion). 
203 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 157–58. 
204 Of course, despite the opportunity to better defend their actions, such defendants will 
still incur the litigation costs, unless such costs can be allocated to a third party. See infra Part 
IV.D. for further discussion on this possibility. 
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that would otherwise violate equal protection, keeping the doctrine in 
line with constitutional principles. 
Finally, the burden-shifting approach to business necessity is 
preferable to the situation that often results under a balancing test—
imposing on the plaintiff the burden and guesswork of anticipating 
and rejecting the possible justifications the defendant may have had. 
In addition to the burdens imposed on the plaintiff, courts applying 
the balancing approach may only infer the defendant’s thought 
process, rather than hearing it from the defendant directly.205 By 
instead placing the burden on the defendants to articulate the reasons 
and logic for their conduct, the burden-shifting standard allows courts 
to “as fairly and effectively as possible” discover “the method by 
which such discriminatory effects were produced, the reason that 
particular method was chosen by the defendant, and the legitimacy of 
such reasons themselves.”206 In this respect, the burden-shifting test 
increases the likelihood that the defendant will “produce his full 
story,”207 giving courts a better understanding of the reasons 
(intentional or unintentional) behind practices with discriminatory 
effects. In serving this function, the burden-shifting analysis may 
more efficiently achieve the government’s interest in rooting out 
intentional discrimination,208 providing courts with a better indication 
of whether there is “something untoward about the defendant’s 
motivations.”209 The burden-shifting test may therefore increase the 
chance that courts will only impose liability when it is well-deserved 
under the “evidentiary dragnet” view of disparate impact, thus 
striking “[t]he correct balance between over- and under-
enforcement.”210  
IV. ADAPTING THE BURDEN-SHIFTING STANDARD TO TITLE VIII 
While a burden-shifting analysis may help to align disparate 
impact doctrine with the goals it was designed to promote, the 
balance between over- and underenforcement “cannot be struck in the 
abstract,” achievement of that balance will depend on “a pragmatic 
                                                                                                                 
205 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 157–58 (“[T]he employer or landlord can more easily 
isolate from among the many possible justifications the interests furthered by the allegedly 
discriminatory practice.”). 
206 Id. at 157. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 157–58 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 338, 343 (E. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)). 
209 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1378 (citing Selmi, supra note 2, at 716, 749). 
210 Rutherglen, Equality, supra note 33, at 2337. 
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assessment of what can be expected to work in different 
[contexts].”211 Although Title VII’s burden-shifting test provides the 
proper framework for evaluating Title VIII disparate impact claims, 
the inherent differences between the housing and employment 
contexts suggest that the analogy may be less than perfect with 
respect to the “business necessity” prong of the burden-shifting 
test.212 As defendant employers are increasingly receiving greater 
deference from the courts, the limitations of the analogy between 
Title VII and Title VIII have become increasingly important.213 This 
Part will explore the inherent differences between housing and 
employment, and will discuss how these differences warrant several 
important variations on the burden-shifting test when it is applied in 
the Title VIII context.  
Specifically, this Part will propose that given the limited number 
of relevant considerations in decisions involving allocation of 
housing, Title VIII defendants should bear a higher burden than their 
Title VII counterparts when seeking to justify practices that produce a 
discriminatory result. In light of the unique and often remedial role of 
government entities in the housing context, this Part will demonstrate 
that a “compelling business necessity” standard is appropriate for 
government actions that produce a discriminatory effect. While these 
variations on the burden-shifting test do not necessarily impact 
whether or not the disparate impact doctrine satisfies the “narrow 
tailoring” requirement of strict scrutiny, they are meant to better 
reflect the congressional purposes behind Title VIII.214 
A. Business Necessity: Current Applications 
Like much of antidiscrimination law, the concept of “business 
necessity” has proven to be a source of confusion for courts in both 
employment and housing discrimination cases. When the Supreme 
Court first recognized the business necessity defense in the 
employment context, the Court declared that a job requirement that 
has a discriminatory effect may only survive if it has a “manifest 
relationship” to the employment in question, and fulfills a “genuine 
                                                                                                                 
211 Id. 
212 See id. at 2314 (noting that context is a crucial factor in determining the weight and 
terms of a defendant’s burden). 
213 See Christopher P. McCormack, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an 
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 
565–66 (1986) (“For Title VIII, the limits of the analogy with Title VII are becoming more 
important as employers’ discretion receives greater deference in Title VII doctrine.”). 
214 See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing congressional intent). 
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business need.”215 Other courts have adopted similar recitations of 
this test, including whether the practice is “necessary to the safe and 
efficient operation of the business.”216 
Regardless of the specific phrasing used, most courts consider 
three main factors in evaluating a business necessity defense:  
(1) whether the practice relates to a valid business purpose that is 
sufficient to override any discriminatory effects; (2) whether the 
practice effectively serves business operations; and (3) whether the 
defendant has no alternative means of achieving its business goal.217 
Most courts agree that a defendant cannot fulfill the burden by simply 
supplying evidence of job-relatedness,218 but instead must present (at 
the very least) “convincing facts establishing a fit between the 
qualification and the job.”219 Thus, courts tend to construe the defense 
narrowly, often requiring a defendant to show that “dire economic 
consequences” will result from changing a practice that produces 
disparate impact.220 
In the housing context, courts applying the burden-shifting 
analysis have also taken a variety of approaches to the nature of a 
defendant’s burden of justification, drawing mainly from these Title 
VII principles. In United States v. City of Black Jack,221 the Eighth 
Circuit imposed a heavy burden on a local government to justify a 
city zoning ordinance which prohibited construction of any new 
multi-family homes.222 In order to justify the ordinance, which it 
found to have a racially discriminatory effect, the court held the city 
to a strict scrutiny standard similar to the test employed under equal 
protection jurisprudence, requiring that a practice be “necessary” to 
serve a “compelling governmental interest.”223 Despite the City’s 
assertions of several interests (including traffic safety, prevention of 
school overcrowding, and the need to prevent devaluation of single 
family homes), the court refused to recognize any of these interests as 
sufficiently compelling, and struck down the ordinance as a violation 
of Title VIII.224 
                                                                                                                 
215 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
216 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971). 
217 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 175–76. 
218 Id. at 176. 
219 See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972). 
220 McCormack, supra note 213, at 570.  
221 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that the city could not justify its practices under 
the business necessity standard where the practice served no compelling government interest). 
222 Id. at 1181–82. 
223 Id. at 1185. 
224 Id. at 1187. 
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In contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s stringent approach, other courts 
have granted slightly more deference to Title VIII defendants, 
requiring only that a contested practice serve a “legitimate, bona fide 
interest,” and “that no alternative course of action could be adopted 
that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory 
impact.”225 In Rizzo, the Third Circuit also specifically noted how the 
differences between housing and employment might affect disparate 
impact analysis.226 As the court observed, the “the job-related 
qualities which might legitimately bar a Title VII-protected employee 
from employment will be much more susceptible to definition and 
quantification than any attempted justification of discriminatory 
housing practices under Title VIII.”227 While this observation may 
seem to suggest that business necessity is more easily proven in the 
employment context, the court did not go so far as to indicate that a 
lower business necessity standard would be appropriate in housing 
cases. Rather, as the following section will illustrate, the differences 
between housing and employment suggest that given the limited 
number of legitimate justifications for denying housing to a qualified 
applicant, Title VIII defendants should bear a higher burden than their 
Title VII counterparts when seeking to rebut a prima facie case of 
disparate impact. 
B. Raising the Bar for Title VIII Defendants 
In order to fully examine the reasons in favor of imposing a higher 
burden on Title VIII defendants, it is necessary to explore the types of 
justifications defendants commonly offer in both Title VII and Title 
VIII cases, especially those justifications based on applicant 
characteristics and the financial burdens of changing a practice that 
produces a discriminatory effect.228 This section will explore how, in 
light of these justifications and the inherent differences between the 
housing and employment contexts, defendants in Title VIII cases 
should bear a greater burden than Title VII defendants when 
justifying practices that produce a discriminatory effect.229 Where the 
justification is based on applicant characteristics, there are fewer 
                                                                                                                 
225 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). 
226 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 436. 
227 Rizzo, 464 F.3d at 148. 
228 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177 (“[These justifications] may include such 
subjective criteria as the absence of fellow employee or neighbor recommendations, or more 
objective standards such as an applicant’s prior arrest record or past wage garnishment.”). 
229 See McCormack, supra note 213, at 565 (“[F]ewer business considerations will suffice 
to support the defense of business necessity in housing than in employment”). 
 2/15/2011 6:16:48 PM 
2011] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND BEYOND 635 
relevant characteristics in the housing context, most of which are 
objective in nature. Where the justification is based on financial 
burden, the potential losses to private defendants are generally 
speculative at best, and government defendants have little room to 
argue that financial concerns trump more humanitarian objectives.230 
1. Justifications Based on Applicant Characteristics 
Defendants in both housing and employment contexts often seek to 
justify their actions based on applicant characteristics, which may 
range from subjective (i.e., neighbor or employee recommendations) 
to objective (i.e., past criminal records, history of wage garnishment) 
in nature.231 For the most part, courts have held that these 
justifications are valid only to the extent that they reflect an 
applicant’s ability to perform legitimate employee or tenant/purchaser 
obligations.232 In the employment context, such obligations generally 
include the ability to perform a job safely and efficiently. Similarly, 
housing obligations generally include the ability to pay either rent or a 
purchase amount, and to maintain facilities in the case of a rental. 
Therefore, characteristics such as criminal records or neighbor 
recommendations should not serve as legitimate justifications, unless 
they help to identify characteristics related to these obligations.233  
Of course, the differing nature of the relationships formed in the 
housing and employment contexts suggest that there is less room for a 
Title VIII defendant to justify a particular practice based on applicant 
characteristics. As a noted scholar in the field of housing 
discrimination has observed, employee-employer relationships are 
necessarily ongoing in nature.234 Because these relationships often 
require an employee to have specific knowledge and experience 
related to the employer’s line of work and method of doing business, 
employers must often consider a wide array factors that relate to 
effective job performance, from obvious qualifications like education 
and training, to more subtle requirements such as height and weight, 
which may relate to productivity in certain contexts.235 In short, an 
                                                                                                                 
230 See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(arguing that financial concerns should yield to more compassionate objectives in the housing 
context). 
231 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177–78. 
232 Id. (noting that requirements should be limited to essential obligations such as the 
ability to pay rent or maintain the property).  
233 Id., at 178. 
234 Schwemm, supra note 43, at 235. 
235 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 177–78; see also McCormack, supra note 213, at 567 
(observing that in the housing context, “fine points of skill, education and the like are not 
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“employer has broad areas of legitimate concern; a decision to hire 
creates a relationship in which highly diverse considerations of safety, 
efficiency, and the worker’s skill can be important.”236 In such cases, 
courts may be ill equipped to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
employer’s unique and specialized considerations, and may be less 
willing to interfere with business efficiency and productivity.237 
In contrast, the concerns faced by housing providers tend to be 
more limited in scope and more objective in nature.238 While certain 
housing transactions, such as the rental of an apartment, create an 
ongoing relationship between the landlord and tenant, others, such as 
the sale of a home, end at the point of closing. In these situations, 
very few factors are relevant in terms of what constitutes a 
“desirable” renter or buyer, as a seller or lessor’s main consideration 
is the applicant’s ability to pay the desired price.239 Because this 
consideration is an easily quantifiable “applicant characteristic,” 
courts are better equipped to evaluate the legitimacy of a landlord’s or 
seller’s practices, and may be less willing to defer to a defendant’s 
decision-making discretion.240 Indeed, the consequences of selecting 
an unqualified candidate are likely to be more severe in an 
employment context,241 suggesting that judicial deference to the 
defendant's judgment is less warranted in the housing context.242 
2. Justifications Based on Financial Burden 
In addition to applicant characteristics, defendants in disparate 
impact cases often seek to justify their practices on the ground that 
changing those practices will impose financial burdens on the 
defendants’ business operations.243 For instance, employers may point 
to the costs of developing new aptitude tests that do not produce 
                                                                                                                 
 
critical, if important at all”). 
236 McCormack, supra note 213, at 566. 
237 See id. (noting that while Title VII contains several exemptions which reflect 
Congress’s intent to minimize interference with an employer’s business operations, Title VIII 
contains no such exceptions). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 566–67. Of course, in a rental situation, the lessor may also be concerned with 
other factors, such as the potential renter’s ability to maintain the premises. 
240 Id. at 565–66. McCormack also notes that “[t]he concept of business 
necessity . . . cannot raise many issues of legitimate concern” for housing providers. Id. at 602. 
241 Schwemm, supra note 43, at 235 (quoting Mincberg, supra note 180, at 174). 
242 Mincberg, supra note 180, at 174 (“Indeed, in housing, the consequences of an error in 
admitting a tenant do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in 
hiring an unqualified airline pilot.”). 
243 Id. at 178. 
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discriminatory results, or to the costs associated with training 
employees who do not have the skills or knowledge that were 
previously required under a policy that produced discriminatory 
effects. While the magnitude of these burdens may be subject to 
debate, one thing is certain: the costs associated with changing a 
business practice are almost certain to accrue once relief is granted 
against an employer. 
Housing providers may also argue that changing a business 
practice will would create a financial burden to the landlord, such that 
maintenance of the practice serves a “business necessity.”244 To 
illustrate, many private landlords use a potential tenant’s credit score 
as a selection criteria designed to measure the tenant’s risk of 
default.245 Because minority applicants statistically have lower credit 
scores than white applicants, such practices may produce a 
discriminatory effect.246 While a landlord may seek to justify this 
practice on the ground that changing the policy would expose her to a 
greater risk of renter default, such a financial burden (assuming it 
materializes at all) is far less immediate than those which are likely to 
result from changing an employment practice.247 As a result, courts 
are less likely to sympathize with the housing provider who asserts 
such a defense, thus increasing the burden on Title VIII defendants. 
Additionally, in the context of government-subsidized housing, 
where potential defendants often play a remedial role,248 justifications 
based on financial burdens are even less persuasive. While financial 
concerns are of great importance to private and governmental 
employers alike, government housing providers and regulators will 
find it difficult to justify their practices based on financial concerns 
alone.249 Unlike governmental employers, government regulators and 
                                                                                                                 
244 See e.g., Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that a landlord 
who required potential tenants to have a weekly income equal to 90% of the monthly rent, or 
have a third party guarantee rent payments was permissible), called into question by Huntington 
Branch, NAACP. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven if the 
views expressed in Lefrak still apply in a Title VIII case against a private defendant, a matter of 
considerable uncertainty, the disparate impact approach of Title VII cases is fully applicable to 
this Title VIII case brought against a public defendant.”).  
245 See Gordon, supra note 161, at 448–49 (“In both the rental and homeownership 
markets, credit checks play a major role in housing allocation.”). 
246 See id. (discussing data demonstrating the lesser credit scores of minorities compared to 
those of whites and the resultant disadvantage posed in obtaining housing). 
247 Unlike the definite costs associated with changing an employment practice, the 
possibility of renter default is only a risk, and not certain to impose a burden on the housing 
provider. 
248 See infra Part IV.C.2 for a further discussion of government entities’ remedial roles in 
the housing context. 
249 See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the inadequacy of “cost-minimization” as a legitimate 
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housing providers do not have the same money-making interests as a 
private entity, and are even less justified in citing financial burdens as 
legitimate concerns.250  
C. How Heavy a Burden? 
Having established that Title VIII defendants should bear a heavier 
burden in justifying practices that produce discriminatory effects, the 
question thus becomes how heavy a burden to impose, and whether 
that burden should be applied uniformly to both government and 
private defendants. 
1. Private Defendants and “Intermediate Scrutiny” 
In discussing the appropriate burden to place upon Title VIII 
defendants, one commentator has suggested that an “intermediate 
standard” of review “similar to equal protection intermediate 
scrutiny” may be the most appropriate form of analysis, particularly 
for private defendants.251 While a more lenient standard—particularly 
one that would justify a discriminatory effect whenever a “legitimate” 
goal was at stake—would defeat the Congressional goals behind Title 
VIII altogether,252 a stricter standard would create an insurmountable 
obstacle for private defendants seeking to justify their practices.253 
Therefore, in light of the difficulties associated with these more 
“extreme” versions of a business necessity test, “[s]ome form of 
intermediate standard of review is necessary.”254  
Adoption of an intermediate standard also follows logically from 
the idea that the “business necessity” analysis commonly employed in 
Title VII cases mirrors the “rational basis” review employed in equal 
protection cases.255 Thus, if Title VIII defendants are to bear a higher 
                                                                                                                 
 
interest in the housing context). 
250 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the unique role of government entities in the housing 
context). 
251 See Stick, supra note 64, at 428–29 & n.146 (noting that the choice of a proper test for 
Title VIII claims is between the balancing test and an “intermediate absolute test”). Stick uses 
the term “absolute standard” as a catch-all for the various forms of the burden-shifting analysis 
that courts have applied in disparate impact cases. See id. at 408, 417. 
252 Id. at 426–27 (“Congress intended housing practices with discriminatory effects to be 
permitted only if strongly justified.”). 
253 See id. at 425–26 (noting that absent a compelling interest, “almost every [private] 
action that produces a discriminatory effect would be found to be a violation of Title VIII”).  
254 Id. at 428. 
255 See id. at 426 (noting that cost minimization often satisfies Title VII’s “legitimate goal” 
requirement).  
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burden than their Title VII counterparts, then application of the next 
highest level of scrutiny should be warranted for practices that 
produce discriminatory effects in housing.256 Under the “intermediate 
scrutiny” analysis, Title VIII defendants should be required to show 
that any practice producing a discriminatory effect serves an 
“important interest,” and that no alternative practices exist.257  
The question then arises: what, if any, interests could be 
sufficiently “important” to justify housing practices that produce a 
discriminatory effect? In Title VII cases, employers often successfully 
defend their practices on the basis that alternative measures would not 
serve the employer’s cost-minimization objectives as effectively as 
current practices.258 The legislative history of Title VIII, however, 
suggests that “[i]f a practice with discriminatory effects could be 
justified whenever it costs less than the alternatives, [Title VIII] 
would be meaningless.”259 Because Congress’s goal in enacting Title 
VIII was to achieve “‘truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns,’”260 Title VIII was intended to combat more than discrete 
acts of discrimination in actual sales or rentals of housing, and was 
“seen as an attempt to alter the whole character of the housing 
market.”261 In light of these ambitious goals—which arguably go 
further than Congress’s goals in enacting Title VII262—it would be 
difficult to argue that Congress intended for a housing provider’s 
interests in “cost minimization” to outweigh the importance Congress 
placed on integrated housing patterns.  
                                                                                                                 
256 In equal protection jurisprudence, intermediate scrutiny serves as the “middle ground” 
between rational basis and strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210–
11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that the Court’s gender discrimination 
analysis “will be viewed by some as a ‘middle-tier’ approach”). 
257 See Stick, supra note 64, at 429 (observing that the “no alternative” requirement mirrors 
the “substantial relationship” between means and ends required under an equal protection 
analysis). 
258 In practice, courts often accept mere “cost minimization” as a legitimate interest for 
Title VII defendants. See id. at 426 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971)). The legislative history of Title VIII suggests, however, that such an interest should be 
insufficient to justify discriminatory effects in the housing context. Id.  
259 Id.  
260 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 
3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale)). 
261 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
262 The purpose of Title VII “‘is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather 
than on the basis of race or color.’” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7247 
(1964)). This language, when compared to the stated goals behind Title VIII, suggests that while 
Congress intended for Title VIII to accomplish a complete and perhaps long-term overhaul of 
the housing situation in the United States, its goals in enacting Title VII focused more on the 
immediate effects of adverse employment actions.  
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Therefore, under a business necessity test that tracks intermediate 
scrutiny analysis, Title VIII defendants should be required to show 
that a practice serves an interest greater than merely “cost 
minimization.”263 The question then arises: what other “interests” may 
be important enough to justify private housing practices that produce 
discriminatory effects? The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mountain Side 
Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development264 may offer some guidance on this issue. In Mountain 
Side, the court held that a mobile home park owner’s interests in 
avoiding problems associated with exceeding the sewer system’s 
capacity limitations and preserving the quality of life within the park, 
were sufficiently important to justify the defendant’s practice of 
limiting mobile home occupancy to three residents per home.265 
Crucial to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling was its determination that the 
occupancy limit had “a manifest relationship to the housing in 
question.”266 Mountain Side therefore suggests that in order for an 
interest to be deemed “important” for purposes of business necessity 
analysis, it must relate to the nature of the housing at issue, and must 
affect the private defendant’s ability to effectively provide such 
housing.267 However, because the level of relatedness between a 
practice and the housing at issue is likely to be highly contextual, 
courts should conduct this inquiry on a case-by-case basis. While 
courts should keep a careful eye out for instances of intentional 
                                                                                                                 
263 See Stick, supra note 64, at 426 (observing that the effect of a weak standard of review 
in Title VIII cases is an ability of defendants to present cost minimization as a legitimate goal). 
An exception to this rule should be made in cases where a defendant would suffer “dire 
economic consequences” if forced to change his practices. See McCormack, supra note 213, at 
570 (discussing the rigorous standard the courts have applied to determine whether business 
necessity is a sufficient defense to overcome disparate impact). While avoidance of such 
hardship would understandably qualify as an important interest—particularly where the 
hardship could lead to the downfall of the defendant’s entire business—a defendant’s interest in 
raising his income marginally should be outweighed by a plaintiff’s interests in fair housing. 
264 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995). While at first glance the Tenth Circuit appears to apply 
the Arlington Heights II balancing test, the court in fact conducts a burden-shifting analysis in 
determining that the defendant’s showing of “business necessity” successfully rebutted the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Id. at 1253. 
265 Id.  
266 Id. at 1254. As the court noted, an “insubstantial justification in this regard will not 
suffice, because such a low standard would permit discrimination to be practiced through the 
use of spurious, seemingly neutral practices.” Id. 
267 Under this analysis, practices related to financial concerns could still arguably qualify 
as “important.” For instance, a private homeowner’s association that requires monthly 
homeowner’s fees could potentially justify its practice, despite any discriminatory effects it 
produces, on the basis that fees are essential to the association’s ability to provide the type of 
living conditions that residents seek and expect in that type of housing, thus creating a 
relationship between the practice and the housing at issue. 
 2/15/2011 6:16:48 PM 
2011] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND BEYOND 641 
discrimination masquerading as a legitimate practice, their application 
of the burden-shifting standard should alleviate this concern.268 
2. Government Defendants and “Compelling Business Necessity” 
While courts generally apply Title VII’s business necessity 
standard uniformly to both public and private defendants, courts 
addressing Title VIII claims have recognized the unique role of 
government entities in the housing context, and have developed 
different business necessity standards for public and private 
entities.269 Although government and private employers perform 
virtually identical roles, the roles of government and private entities 
differ significantly in the housing context. As a result, many of the 
roles served by government entities in the housing context have no 
parallel in the context of employment.270  
In the housing context, government entities often regulate third 
parties through zoning ordinances and permit policies. In this respect, 
a potential defendant functions solely as a government entity by 
performing a duty for which private entities have no authority. 
However, government entities may also engage in housing-related 
activities that parallel those of a private entity, including 
administration of low-income housing programs.271 However, in light 
of the remedial nature of these activities, government defendants in 
the housing context do not have the same moneymaking interest as 
private landlords or developers. Government housing providers also 
differ from government employers in this respect, as government 
employers have a valid interest in generating revenue.272 Because 
“success” of an operation is not as easily quantifiable where money is 
not a consideration, government defendants in housing cases should 
                                                                                                                 
268 See supra Part III.C.2. 
269 See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting 
that different standards should apply based on whether the defendant is a government or private 
entity). See also McCormack, supra note 213, at 602 (noting that there is no consensus on the 
appropriate standard for a government defendant seeking to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case). 
270 McCormack, supra note 213, at 601–02. 
271 See id. (analogizing government housing providers to private landlords). 
272 This financial interest is implied by courts’ willingness to recognize a “business 
necessity” defense in Title VII cases against government defendants. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (recognizing the business necessity standard); see also 
McCormack, supra note 213, at 601–02 & n.273 (recognizing courts’ use of the business 
necessity defense in Title VII cases against public and private defendants and discussing the 
stronger merits of the defense when used by public entities in Title VII cases than in Title VIII 
cases). 
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bear a heavier burden than their private counterparts in proving that a 
given practice is “necessary” to the achievement of their objectives.273  
For this reason, most courts addressing Title VIII disparate impact 
claims have imposed a higher burden on government entities than on 
private defendants to justify actions that produce a discriminatory 
effect.274 This trend and the logic behind it suggest that in Title VIII 
cases involving government defendants, the Eighth Circuit’s 
heightened “compelling business necessity” may be a more 
appropriate standard. 
While the Third Circuit has rejected the “compelling business 
necessity” standard as too stringent, even for government 
defendants,275 the Supreme Court may not agree. In Trafficante,276 the 
Court held that administrative interpretations of Title VIII by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
administrative agency responsible for implementing and 
administering Title VIII,277 are “entitled to great weight.”278 In the 
administrative proceeding leading up to the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
in Mountain Side, the Secretary of HUD interpreted Title VIII as 
encompassing a “compelling business necessity” standard for 
defendants seeking to justify their practices.279 While the Court’s 
holding in Trafficante predated this interpretation, Trafficante 
nonetheless suggests that the Supreme Court would give substantial 
weight to HUD’s endorsement of a “compelling business necessity” 
standard if confronted with the issue.280 
                                                                                                                 
273 McCormack, supra note 213, at 602 (citing Betsey, 736 F.2d 983; Resident Advisory 
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 
(8th Cir. 1974)). 
274 McCormack, supra note 213, at 602–03 (citing Betsey, 736 F.2d 983; Rizzo, 564 F.2d 
126; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179). 
275 See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148–49 (noting that because a “compelling interest” is not 
required under Title VII, such a heavy burden should be reserved only for those defendants 
seeking to justify purposeful discrimination). 
276 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
277 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006) (granting authority to enforce Title VIII to the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 
107 (1979) (describing HUD as “the federal agency primarily assigned to implement and 
administer Title VIII”). 
278 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)). 
279 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 443–44. 
280 While several circuit courts have rejected HUD’s compelling business necessity 
standard, those cases involved the standard as applied to private defendants. Thus, even if the 
Supreme Court finds such decisions informative, the possibility remains that HUD’s compelling 
business necessity standard may be appropriate for government defendants. See Pfaff v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a “reasonableness” 
standard); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 
1254 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Secretary in the administrative proceedings incorrectly 
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Interestingly, the City of Black Jack’s “compelling business 
necessity” requirement closely parallels the “compelling state 
interest” standard imposed in cases involving constitutional violations 
that trigger strict scrutiny review.281 While strict scrutiny was once 
thought to be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”282 subsequent 
jurisprudential developments have disproven this notion,283 leaving 
open the possibility that certain government interests may be 
sufficiently compelling to justify facially neutral practices that 
produce discriminatory effects.284 Moreover, as Judge Posner has 
observed, it may be more constitutionally appropriate to impose a 
higher burden on government entities than it is to require the same of 
private parties.285 This may be attributed in part to the fact that 
government defendants are more likely than their private counterparts 
to successfully assert an interest sufficiently “compelling” to justify 
practices that produce discriminatory effects.286 As one commentator 
has suggested, financial objectives in the housing context should give 
                                                                                                                 
 
required the defendant to demonstrate a compelling necessity). 
281 This inference is furthered by the Eighth Circuit’s explicit reliance on equal protection 
jurisprudence in articulating its decision. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 
1179, 1185 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1974). Application of this heightened standard would complete the 
analogy between the statutory business necessity standard and equal protection scrutiny. As 
discussed supra, business necessity for Title VII defendants resembles rational basis review; for 
Title VIII private defendants, business necessity resembles intermediate scrutiny review. For the 
reasons discussed in this section, it follows that business necessity for Title VIII government 
defendants should resemble the highest level of scrutiny. 
282 Stick, supra note 64, at 425 n.131 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
283 See supra Part III.B (discussing Grutter). While these developments have taken place in 
the context of equal protection claims, the notion that certain measures may survive strict 
scrutiny applies with equal force in the Title VIII context.  
284 While equal protection strict scrutiny applies only to instances of intentional 
discrimination or disparate treatment, the “compelling business necessity” standard proposed in 
Black Jack applies to facially neutral practices that produce a disparate impact. While the 
application is different, the level of scrutiny is essentially the same. 
285 See Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“It 
is one thing to require a municipal government to consider the impact of its zoning decisions on 
the racial composition of the municipality, another to require an individual broker to consider 
and take steps to prevent [disparate impact].”). 
286 Despite his protestations against a strict scrutiny standard for business necessity, Stick 
implicitly recognizes that government defendants may have an easier time justifying 
discriminatory effects. Although he states that “[e]ven governmental defendants rarely have 
compelling interests at stake,” Stick, supra note 64, at 426 (emphasis added), this contrasts with 
Stick’s view of private defendants’ likelihood of asserting a compelling interest, which appears 
to be virtually zero. Id. at 425–26.  
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way to more “humane and compassionate mores,”287 particularly 
where the defendant is a government entity.288 
D. “Multiple Actor” Problems and the Need for an  
“Intervening Cause” Defense 
The forgoing analysis may appear to create a significant hurdle for 
Title VIII defendants—both private and public—particularly in light 
of the “multiple actor” problem, which is unique to the housing 
context.289 The multiple-actor concept recognizes that, in contrast to 
discriminatory effects in the employment context, discriminatory 
effects in the housing context are often the result of more than one 
entity’s actions.290 While a defendant employer’s practices are often 
directly responsible for the discriminatory effects alleged in Title VII 
cases, Title VIII cases often involve multiple actors that play diverse 
roles within the housing market. Because of this phenomenon, it is 
often unclear which actor’s practices have produced the disparate 
effect alleged.291 The implications may be even more serious when 
the actor named as a defendant in a disparate impact case is not the 
source of the problem. 
For instance, private developers and sellers of real estate have little 
control over the practices of other private entities such as mortgage 
brokers and lending institutions. This means that private sellers who 
require purchasers to obtain bank financing, for instance, could 
potentially be held liable under disparate impact theory for the 
discriminatory actions of a lender who chooses only to grant loans to 
members of a certain group.292  
This problem suggests that Title VIII defendants should be able to 
defend against discriminatory effects for which they are not 
responsible, or over which they have no control. In addition to 
promoting general fairness, such a defense may be beneficial to 
disparate impact doctrine in several ways, particularly if the doctrine 
is to survive a constitutional challenge. First, recognition of an 
affirmative defense based on intervening causes or factors may 
further enable disparate impact doctrine to satisfy the narrow tailoring 
                                                                                                                 
287 United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1973). 
288 See Mincberg, supra note 180, at 179 (applying the “more humane and compassionate 
mores” argument to cases involving government entities). 
289 See Gordon, supra note 161, at 451 (discussing the multiple actor dilemma). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 See id. at 451–52 (discussing the greater ease with which developers and lenders can 
defend alleged Title VIII violations than can municipal actors). 
 2/15/2011 6:16:48 PM 
2011] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND BEYOND 645 
requirement of strict scrutiny,293 as it will prevent courts from 
imposing liability on innocent defendants. Instead, the intervening 
cause defense may better enable courts to determine the true source of 
discriminatory effects, and to investigate further if there are indicators 
of discriminatory intent. 
Second, recognition of an affirmative defense based on intervening 
causes may further reduce the risk that housing providers will “adopt 
prophylactic measures” in order to avoid disparate impact liability.294 
While defendants pursuing such a defense will run the risk of 
incurring litigation costs, these costs may be offset by an 
indemnification claim for litigation costs against the third party.295 
This possibility for indemnification may further assure employers and 
housing providers that race-conscious measures are unnecessary to 
avoid disparate impact liability. By ceasing to promote race-conscious 
conduct in this manner, recognition of an affirmative defense based 
on intervening causes may further reduce a major source of conflict 
between disparate impact and equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Disparate impact doctrine under Title VIII is fraught with 
inconsistencies, particularly with respect to the appropriate test the 
court should use. While part of the blame lies with the Supreme Court 
for its dearth of guidance, even a proper ruling or a Congressional 
amendment296 would leave open the debate regarding disparate 
impact’s relationship to equal protection. As revealed in Ricci v. De 
Stefano, disparate impact and the pressure it imposes on employers 
and housing providers to avoid liability may very well conflict with 
equal protection’s ban on racial classifications. Despite this apparent 
contradiction, the two doctrines may still be reconciled, depending on 
how future courts read Ricci and interpret disparate impact’s purpose. 
                                                                                                                 
293 See supra Part II.C for further discussion of the narrow tailoring issue. 
294 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing judicial concerns that disparate impact will encourage 
adoption of prophylactic measures). 
295 For instance, the private developer who requires home buyers to obtain bank financing 
as a prerequisite to a sale could defend her practice in spite of any discriminatory effects by 
showing that the bank’s practice of granting loans disproportionately to members of a minority 
group was in fact the underlying cause of any discriminatory effects alleged. While the 
developer would undoubtedly incur litigation expenses during this process, she could potentially 
recoup those costs by seeking indemnification against the bank as a third party defendant. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and 
complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”). 
296 Congress amended Title VII to explicitly include a disparate impact standard and the 
burden-shifting framework. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006)). 
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As Richard Primus suggests, disparate impact, when viewed as a tool 
for rooting out discriminatory motives, may in fact serve a compelling 
government interest in preventing overtly discriminatory acts.297 If 
disparate impact doctrine is to survive strict scrutiny, however, it 
must also be narrowly tailored to achieving that end. This requirement 
is instructive with respect to the proper test to be applied in Title VIII 
cases. Because disparate impact is more likely to directly serve the 
government’s interest when framed as a burden-shifting analysis, 
courts should abandon the Arlington Heights II balancing test in favor 
of the Title VII framework. 
While Title VII’s standards provide a useful guidepost for courts 
addressing Title VIII claims, the differences between the housing and 
employment contexts limit their applicability to Title VIII claims. 
Because there are likely to be fewer valid justifications for practices 
that produce discriminatory effects in the housing context,298 it is only 
fair to subject Title VIII defendants to a higher standard of proof. This 
proposition fits nicely with the idea that all racial classifications must 
be subject to strict scrutiny; because very few (if any) differences 
among racial groups will justify unequal treatment, a higher standard 
of review should apply.299 Moreover, such a standard is undoubtedly 
important if courts are to achieve a thorough understanding of the 
defendant’s rationale, imposing liability only when a clear indication 
of discriminatory intent is present. In this respect, application of a 
higher standard will more directly serve the government’s interest in 
rooting out intentional discrimination, increasing disparate impact’s 
chances of surviving strict scrutiny. 
It is important to note, of course, that there may very well be 
solutions to the constitutional dilemma that do not subject disparate 
impact to strict scrutiny at all.300 In that case, the absence of a narrow 
tailoring requirement would eliminate a major justification for 
abandoning the balancing test. Moreover, if the Court interprets Ricci 
in a manner that differs from Primus’s “general reading” of the case, 
the conflict between disparate impact and equal protection may be 
less of a threat than some critics and members of the Court appear to 
                                                                                                                 
297 Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1377. 
298 See McCormack, supra note 213, at 565–66 (discussing the limitations of Title VII 
justifications as applied to Title VIII defendants). 
299 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that race is “a 
group classification long recognized as . . . irrelevant” and that it “should be subjected to 
detailed judicial inquiry”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
300 See Primus, Round Three, supra note 15, at 501 (“Traditionally, the most 
straightforward strategy for protecting disparate impact doctrine from a constitutional challenge 
would be to avoid heightened scrutiny altogether.”). 
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believe.301 This is not to say that courts would be entirely justified in 
continuing to apply the balancing test under Title VIII. As this Note 
and other critics have observed, the balancing test is arguably flawed 
in several ways, which may explain why lower courts have chosen to 
reject it in favor of the Title VII framework.302 Regardless, the 
resolution of these questions will depend largely on the facts and 
circumstances of future disparate impact cases. While one can only 
speculate as to what the future will bring, any outcome regarding 
disparate impact doctrine, its constitutionality, and its application in 
Title VIII will be “highly salient for years to come.”303 
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301 Compare Primus, Future, supra note 12, at 1382 (“Characterizing Title VII’s disparate 
impact provisions as an evidentiary dragnet could save those provisions from wholesale 
invalidation in a world where the courts adopted the general reading of Ricci.”), with id. at 1346 
(“[D]isparate impact doctrine could survive the institutional reading or the visible-victims 
reading, or a combination of the two.”). 
302 See Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McGlothin 885 N.E.2d 
1274, 1282 (Ind. 2008) (noting that the balancing test “seems doctrinally unsound,” especially 
in light of the language similarities between Title VII and Title VIII).  
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